Offline verification
Self-verify the evidence package of a post on your own machine, without access and without trusting the ACI-OS system: download the open-source tool, compare the SHA-256 code, pin the University's trusted anchor fingerprints, or manually verify the signature with OpenSSL.
Signature scope (KT record): Post-quantum technical signature of the ACI-OS system: proves the origin and integrity of the artifact – not a digital signature with legal validity under the Law on Electronic Transactions
1. Download the aci_verify.py tool
- SHA-256 of the file
- ecad93dd3f090bb684eb1f29dd2b868a85c732467a0d6c8bec13284633246bd3
- aci_verify.py.sha256 (form usable with
sha256sum -c) - Compare the hash after downloading
sha256sum aci_verify.py(Linux) ·shasum -a 256 aci_verify.py(macOS) ·certutil -hashfile aci_verify.py SHA256(Windows) ·openssl dgst -sha256 aci_verify.py- Source code
- A directly readable Python file with no ACI-OS dependency, copied from the system's 10-step verifier. Redistribution license: pending the University's decision.
2. Run the 10-step verification
pip install "cryptography>=50"
python aci_verify.py ART-2026-0001-bang-chung.zip --anchor fa8da4533e736f6628d2db5a413dafe6eda337004aa4e0c474036c65a8e08537,e3d49e0d1804698f263424e63cb8ebdfd2cbfeb6b60572b57a5fd27622c74558
python aci_verify.py ART-2026-0001-bang-chung.zip --anchor <…> --engine openssl # chỉ cần dòng lệnh OpenSSL ≥ 3.5
curl -s <địa chỉ cổng>/api/v1/trust/anchor -o anchor.json # neo, khóa neo gốc, danh sách thu hồi
python aci_verify.py ART-2026-0001-bang-chung.zip --anchor-file anchor.json --engine openssl
python aci_verify.py <gói hồ sơ LAI>.zip --anchor-file anchor.json --pl-roots <kho chứng thư gốc>.pem # thêm bước 11: chữ ký pháp lý
Result TRUST RESULT: VALID (exit code 0) when all ten steps pass; INVALID (code 1); INDETERMINATE (mã 3) khi chưa đủ căn cứ kết luận – ví dụ hồ sơ LAI mà chưa có kho chứng thư gốc. Từ ACI-OS 1.7.0 công cụ kiểm khóa ký hợp lệ TẠI THỜI ĐIỂM KÝ (khóa xoay vòng, thu hồi sau đó không làm mất hiệu lực chữ ký cũ; chữ ký từ thời điểm nghi lộ thì không hợp lệ) và vẫn xác minh được gói bằng chứng 1.0 đã tải trước đây. Phạm vi hồ sơ LAI: Hồ sơ ký lai (LAI): chữ ký số pháp lý của người có thẩm quyền theo chứng thư số của tổ chức cung cấp dịch vụ chứng thực, kèm chữ ký kỹ thuật hậu lượng tử của hệ thống ACI-OS trên cùng mã băm nội dung; hợp lệ đầy đủ chỉ khi cả hai chữ ký hợp lệ. Chữ ký kỹ thuật không thay chữ ký pháp lý. Gói bằng chứng tải ở trang kiểm tra của từng bài. Công cụ và bộ máy ký của hệ thống hiện đều dựa trên OpenSSL, nên đây là kiểm chứng bằng mã nguồn công khai, chưa phải «xác minh độc lập» theo nghĩa hai triển khai mật mã khác nguồn gốc.
3. The University's trusted anchors are still trusted
Pin all fingerprints below (separate with commas): a signature made before a key rotation is valid only if both the rotated anchors are pinned. The machine-readable version includes the PEM public keys and rotation declarations: /api/v1/trust/anchor. It is advisable to cross-check with the University's independent publication channel (documents, official information page) once that channel is issued.
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fa8da4533e736f6628d2db5a413dafe6eda337004aa4e0c474036c65a8e08537ML-DSA-65 · in use · created 27/10/2026 18:05
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e3d49e0d1804698f263424e63cb8ebdfd2cbfeb6b60572b57a5fd27622c74558ML-DSA-65 · rotated – use only to verify already-issued signatures · created 26/10/2026 10:08 · stopped signing 27/10/2026 18:05 · rotation declaration: no declaration (before ACI-OS 1.6.3)
Root anchor keys and revocation list
No SLH-DSA root anchor key yet (FIPS 205): the offline key generation ceremony and key sharing among holders are pending the University's decision. Until then, pin the operational anchors directly in section 3.
No keys have been revoked yet.
Second verifier in the browser (different origin from OpenSSL)
Verify ML-DSA signatures using the JavaScript library @noble/post-quantum 0.7.1 (MIT license, self-hosted at /assets/vendor/noble-post-quantum-0.7.1.js) and SHA-256 using the browser's Web Crypto; re-canonicalize the core manifest itself without using the system's signature library. This is candidate D-80 for validation, not yet validated – its result does not replace the conclusion of the 10-step verifier.
Ledger checkpoint SV-11
Each business day, the system signs (KT record) the hash of the latest sealed ledger block and the audit chain head. Save this list elsewhere: if the history in the system is altered, the hashes will no longer match the published checkpoints. Machine-readable version: /api/v1/trust/checkpoints.
- ART-2026-0687 · date 2026-11-19 · ledger block 7928 71a2f43a0206c3ec… · audit chain head #2548 28bac52040cab74b…
- ART-2026-0655 · date 2026-11-18 · ledger block 7729 d87382e89dff8316… · audit chain head #2412 63a6f730f5c0975a…
- ART-2026-0628 · date 2026-11-17 · ledger block 7434 f1ba97e08043b761… · audit chain head #2296 4297bc47d89fd378…
- ART-2026-0593 · date 2026-11-16 · ledger block 6999 dfd79ddc62fd481f… · audit chain head #2160 122ee0940ab699a1…
- ART-2026-0506 · date 2026-11-13 · ledger block 6296 9311a3db85e54526… · audit chain head #1797 15ce342fb1b89da6…
- ART-2026-0473 · date 2026-11-12 · ledger block 6042 1dbc19486bfe715b… · audit chain head #1668 279f9a4b25289ac5…
- ART-2026-0397 · date 2026-11-11 · ledger block 5650 8700c52ca1f1bdd6… · audit chain head #1470 c3f072099576b5bd…
- ART-2026-0337 · date 2026-11-10 · ledger block 5272 0b4d2e438d810810… · audit chain head #1309 ca6d1fd5dd3233ce…
- ART-2026-0294 · date 2026-11-09 · ledger block 4933 0c0a3be4273b13b5… · audit chain head #1156 08927870dfc87503…
- ART-2026-0166 · date 2026-11-06 · ledger block 3455 bcb32fd219b713e0… · audit chain head #737 9e2fa7a087dc49b3…
- ART-2026-0116 · date 2026-11-05 · ledger block 2845 1e4e054382d00433… · audit chain head #583 83d0705c3d165e74…
- ART-2026-0073 · date 2026-11-04 · ledger block 2487 2585b2a92744ad8f… · audit chain head #419 16b3b13403f55b8a…
- ART-2026-0064 · date 2026-11-03 · ledger block 2201 0c098e7b20236636… · audit chain head #386 6384457c6d9c7417…
- ART-2026-0063 · date 2026-11-02 · ledger block 1995 e40a873e44786c41… · audit chain head #361 17479970a2eaa367…
- ART-2026-0060 · date 2026-10-30 · ledger block 1465 41746fe686547e2d… · audit chain head #285 59444a440c738879…
- ART-2026-0057 · date 2026-10-29 · ledger block 1092 7b006d077f175577… · audit chain head #259 4f31beaca2340c65…
4. Manually verify the signature with OpenSSL ≥ 3.5
The signature is pure ML-DSA (FIPS 204) over the core manifest, context string ACI-OS/trust/v1. Python uses only the standard library to extract JSON and Base64; all hashing and verification are performed by OpenSSL. The commands use bash (Linux, macOS, WSL, Git Bash). This section verifies steps 2, 7, 8; the remaining steps (delegation, authority, audit chain) use aci_verify.py.
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1. Unpack the evidence package (artifact file, manifest.json, evidence.json)
unzip ART-2026-0001-bang-chung.zip -d goi && cd goi -
2. Step 7 – hash the artifact file, compare with "artifact" → "sha256" in manifest.json
openssl dgst -sha256 <tên tệp hiện vật> -
3. Signed core manifest = manifest.json with "signature" and "audit" removed, canonical JSON (sorted keys, no whitespace, UTF-8)
python3 -c 'import json; m = json.load(open("manifest.json", encoding="utf-8")); [m.pop(k) for k in ("signature", "audit")]; open("core.bin", "wb").write(json.dumps(m, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8"))' -
4. Signature (Base64 → binary) and the signer's raw public key
python3 -c 'import json, base64; m = json.load(open("manifest.json", encoding="utf-8")); e = json.load(open("evidence.json", encoding="utf-8")); open("sig.bin", "wb").write(base64.b64decode(m["signature"]["value"])); open("pk.bin", "wb").write(base64.b64decode(e["public_key"]["value"]))' -
5. Step 2 – fingerprint = SHA-256 of the raw public key; artifacts signed by the University must match a still-trusted anchor
openssl dgst -sha256 pk.bin -
6. Wrap the raw ML-DSA-65 key into SubjectPublicKeyInfo (OID 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.18)
printf '\x30\x82\x07\xb2\x30\x0b\x06\x09\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x03\x12\x03\x82\x07\xa1\x00' > pub.der && cat pk.bin >> pub.der && openssl pkey -pubin -inform DER -in pub.der -out pub.pem -
7. Step 8 – verify the pure ML-DSA signature with the ACI-OS context; if correct, print "Signature Verified Successfully"
openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey pub.pem -rawin -in core.bin -sigfile sig.bin -pkeyopt context-string:ACI-OS/trust/v1
5. Verify anchor rotation declarations
Since ACI-OS 1.6.3, each key rotation has a declaration (old key, new key, reason, time, library) signed by the old key before it stops and cross-signed by the new key, over the same byte string. The previous rotation had no declaration and is recorded as such. Replace xv0 with the section to check.
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1. Download the trusted anchor list (in use and rotated, with PEM public keys and rotation declarations)
curl -s <địa chỉ cổng>/api/v1/trust/anchor -o anchor.json -
2. Extract each declaration (canonical JSON – the exact signed byte string), the two signatures, and the old and new keys
python3 - <<'EOF' import base64, json a = json.load(open("anchor.json", encoding="utf-8")) keys = {k["fingerprint"]: k for k in [a] + a["history"] + a.get("revoked_anchors", [])} for i, h in enumerate(a["history"]): r = h.get("rotation") or {} if not r.get("statement"): print(f"xv{i}: {h['fingerprint'][:16]}... KHÔNG CÓ TUYÊN BỐ XOAY VÒNG ({r.get('status')})") continue open(f"xv{i}.bin", "wb").write(json.dumps(r["statement"], sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")) open(f"xv{i}.old.pem", "w").write(h["public_key_pem"]) open(f"xv{i}.new.pem", "w").write(keys[r["statement"]["new_key"]["fingerprint"]]["public_key_pem"]) open(f"xv{i}.new.sig", "wb").write(base64.b64decode(r["new_signature"])) if r["old_signature"]: open(f"xv{i}.old.sig", "wb").write(base64.b64decode(r["old_signature"])) print(f"xv{i}: {h['fingerprint'][:16]}... -> {r['statement']['new_key']['fingerprint'][:16]}... {r['status']}") EOF -
3. Signature of the OLD KEY over the declaration (present only when status is «signed»)
openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey xv0.old.pem -rawin -in xv0.bin -sigfile xv0.old.sig -pkeyopt context-string:ACI-OS/trust/v1 -
4. Cross-signature of the NEW KEY over the same declaration
openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey xv0.new.pem -rawin -in xv0.bin -sigfile xv0.new.sig -pkeyopt context-string:ACI-OS/trust/v1
6. Cross-check the University's key through an independent channel
Chữ ký đúng chưa đủ: cần biết khóa đã ký đúng là của Nhà trường. Hãy tự lấy dấu vân tay neo qua ít nhất hai kênh mà bạn biết là của Nhà trường – tài liệu công bố có chữ ký trên trang web, bản ghi tên miền, mã QR trên văn bản giấy – rồi so với neo trong gói. Khóa bị thu hồi vì lộ: chữ ký sau thời điểm nghi lộ không hợp lệ; trước đó chỉ hợp lệ khi thời điểm ký được chứng minh độc lập (dấu thời gian, điểm chốt đã công bố). Mức định danh tách riêng, không thay kết luận về chữ ký.
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1. HTTPS channel – download the anchored published document signed by the University
curl -s https://aci.nute.edu.vn/.well-known/aci-trust.json -o aci-trust.json -
2. Anchor fingerprint currently used in published documents
python3 -c 'import json; print(json.load(open("aci-trust.json", encoding="utf-8"))["document"]["current_anchor_fingerprint"])' -
3. Domain-name channel – DNS TXT record (value a= is the anchor fingerprint, r= is the root anchor key)
nslookup -type=TXT _aci-trust.aci.nute.edu.vn -
4. Automatic: identity level (LIMITED → PUBLISHED when matching ≥ 2 channels; CERTIFIED when there is an X.509 certificate to a pinned root key; LEGALLY-BOUND when there is a legally signed key declaration) – add --qr "<QR code content on the paper document>" if available
python aci_verify.py ART-2026-0001-bang-chung.zip --domain aci.nute.edu.vn --anchor-file anchor.json -
5. Declaration that the University's key has been legally signed (requires the original certificate store of the certifying organization)
curl -s https://aci.nute.edu.vn/api/v1/trust/key-statement.pdf -o tuyen-bo-khoa.pdf && python aci_verify.py ART-2026-0001-bang-chung.zip --domain aci.nute.edu.vn --key-statement tuyen-bo-khoa.pdf --pl-roots goc.pem -
6. Status of a key: in use / retired / revoked, since when, suspected-compromise time, replacement key
curl -s https://aci.nute.edu.vn/api/v1/trust/keys/<dấu vân tay>/status -
7. Signed revocation list (serial number, issue time) – retained for offline verification
curl -s https://aci.nute.edu.vn/api/v1/trust/revocations.json -o thu-hoi.json && python aci_verify.py ART-2026-0001-bang-chung.zip --anchor-file anchor.json --revocation-list thu-hoi.json